The McCarran-Ferguson Act\u27s Intersection with Foreign Insurance Companies by Krupar, Angela D.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
2010
The McCarran-Ferguson Act's Intersection with
Foreign Insurance Companies
Angela D. Krupar
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Insurance Law Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cleveland
State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Note, The McCarran-Ferguson Act's Intersection with Foreign Insurance Companies, 58 Clev. St. L. Rev. 883 (2010)
  
 
883 
THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT’S 
INTERSECTION WITH FOREIGN INSURANCE 
COMPANIES 
ANGELA D. KRUPAR∗  
 I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 883 
 II. UNDERSTANDING THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT ........... 885 
A. “Act of Congress” ....................................................... 885 
B. The History and Enactment of the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act................................................................................ 887 
 III. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT 890 
A. Preemption................................................................... 890 
B. McCarran-Ferguson Act’s Three-Prong Test ............. 891 
C. No Limit on Equal Protection or Due Process  
Clauses......................................................................... 892 
D. Current Split Among the Circuits ................................ 894 
E. The Second Circuit Extends the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act to Foreign Insurers................................................ 894 
F. The Fifth Circuit Limits the McCarran-Ferguson  
Act to Domestic Insurers ............................................. 895 
G. Arguments Restricting Application Are Misguided ..... 898 
 IV. WHY THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD FOLLOW THE SECOND 
CIRCUIT’S LINE OF AUTHORITY AND APPLY THE  
MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT TO FOREIGN INSURERS .......... 899 
A. Plain Language............................................................ 899 
B. State Laws Govern Foreign Insurers........................... 901 
C. Public Policy................................................................ 904 
 V. CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 905 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The touchstone of insurance regulation is the state’s authority to regulate the 
business of insurance, particularly the relationship between insurer and insured.1  
                                                          
∗
  J.D. expected, May 2011, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law; 
B.A., Ohio University.  The author would like to thank her father, James Krupar, for his 
endless support and encouragement, her mother, Kathy Krupar, for her love and support, and 
Professor Kevin F. O’Neill for his input and guidance. 
 
1
 Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 218-19 (1979). 
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2010
884 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:883 
 
Congress has consciously established a statutory scheme that generally preserves 
state regulation of insurance from federal interference.2  
Ordinarily, an act of Congress is “the supreme Law of the Land.”3  But Congress 
may only legislate within defined spheres, such as interstate and domestic 
commerce.4  While the insurance industry developed in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, it was thought to lie outside Congress’ sphere of competence 
because the Supreme Court “had consistently held that the business of insurance was 
not commerce.”5  Accordingly, “the States enjoyed virtually exclusive domain over 
the insurance industry.”6  
But the Supreme Court held for the first time, in United States v. South-Eastern 
Underwriters Ass’n,7 that an insurance company doing business across state lines 
thereby engages in interstate commerce and is therefore subject to federal laws 
regulating commerce.  The very next year, Congress, wishing to preserve the states’ 
primacy in insurance regulation and to protect these efforts from inadvertent 
intrusion by federal law, passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act.8  Section 1012(b) 
provides that federal legislation “general in character” constitutes authority inferior 
to state law specifically regulating “the business of insurance.”9  Thus, in a reversal 
of the usual hierarchy, a state law regulating insurance “reverse preempts” general 
federal legislation. 
Arbitration agreements provide a notable example of McCarran-Ferguson’s 
reverse preemption.  Because of the Federal Arbitration Act,10 arbitration agreements 
are generally enforceable outside the insurance context despite a long history of state 
laws, constitutional provisions, and judicial doctrines prohibiting arbitration.11  
Federal law, as usual, trumps the contrary state law.  But most courts, including all 
courts of appeals to consider the issue, have ruled that a state law regulating “the 
business of insurance” reverse preempts the FAA.12  Currently, approximately one-
                                                          
 
2
 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (2006) [hereinafter McCarran-Ferguson Act]. 
 
3
 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 
4
 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803). 
 
5
 Humana, Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299, 306 (1999) (citing Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 
193 (1869)). 
 
6
 St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 539 (1978). 
 
7
 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 539 (1944). 
 
8
 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (2006). 
 
9
 See Forsyth, 525 U.S. at 306-07. 
 
10
 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2006) [hereinafter FAA]. 
 
11
 See Susan Randall, Mandatory Arbitration in Insurance Disputes: Inverse Preemption 
of the Federal Arbitration Act, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 253, 255-57 (2004). 
 
12
 See, e.g., Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Inman, 436 F.3d 490, 494 (5th Cir. 2006); 
McKnight v. Chi. Title Ins. Co., 358 F.3d 854, 858 (11th Cir. 2004); Standard Sec. Life Ins. 
Co. v. West, 267 F.3d 821, 824 (8th Cir. 2001); Mut. Reinsurance Bureau v. Great Plains Mut. 
Ins. Co., 969 F.2d 931, 933 (10th Cir. 1992). 
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third of the states have limits on arbitration of insurance disputes that would, under 
existing doctrine, reverse preempt the FAA.13  
This Note is designed to answer a simple question: must insurance companies 
incorporated in foreign countries follow the same rules as their competitors 
incorporated in this country?  More specifically, it addresses whether the McCarran-
Ferguson Act should reach foreign insurance companies and foreign commerce.  Part 
II discusses the historical enactment and early interpretation of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act.  Part III explains concepts of preemption and reverse preemption and 
the current divergent views of the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s interpretation in case 
law.  Part IV provides an analysis and proposal as to why the Act should not be 
limited in a way that excludes foreign insurance companies.  This Note advocates for 
the Supreme Court to include foreign insurance companies within the statute, so they 
are not left wholly unregulated when doing business in the United States.  
II.  UNDERSTANDING THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT 
A.  “Act of Congress” 
The McCarran-Ferguson Act is a unique law because, ordinarily, federal law 
preempts or invalidates inconsistent state law.14  However, the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act creates an exception to this general rule exclusively for the business of 
insurance.15  This exception allows state laws, enacted to regulate the business of 
insurance, to reverse preempt inconsistent “acts of Congress.”16  The only time an 
“act of Congress” may “invalidate, impair, or supersede”17 any law enacted by any 
state for the purpose of regulation of the business of insurance is when the Act 
specifically relates to the business of insurance.18   
An “act of Congress” is a law enacted according to formal Article I procedures.19  
It includes any legislation passed by a majority of both houses of Congress, 
presented to and signed into law by the President.20  Thus, a congressional statute is 
by definition an “act of ‘Congress.’”21  States often enact statutes that include anti-
arbitration provisions.  When these statutes affect the business of insurance, the state 
law will preempt inconsistent federal law by way of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.  
Thus, federal laws that do not specifically relate to the business of insurance and 
                                                          
 
13
 Randall, supra note 11, at 270-71. 
 
14
 See U.S. Dep’t of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 507 (1993).   
 
15
 See 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b). 
 
16
 Id. 
 
17
 Id. 
 
18
 Id. 
 
19
 Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944-45 (1983) (citing 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7). 
 
20
 Id. 
 
21
 Denver Area Educ. Telcomm. Consortium Inc. v. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, 518 U.S. 
727, 737 (1996).  
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permit arbitration will be reverse preempted by state laws invalidating arbitration, in 
the insurance context.22   
The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards23 is a treaty signed by the United States.  This treaty and its implementing 
legislation24 permit the United States courts to send disputes to arbitration.  Thus, a 
question arises whether a foreign insurance company whose home country is a party 
to the treaty may invoke the treaty to require an insured from the United States 
whose domicile state has an anti-arbitration statute to submit a claim to arbitration 
abroad.  The answer hinges upon an initial decision as to whether the treaty is an “act 
of Congress” under the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.  
Treaties can be either self-executing or non-self-executing.  A self-executing 
treaty has automatic domestic effect by its own provisions.25  A non-self-executing 
treaty is given force through an act of Congress26 and, as an act of Congress, is 
subject to the McCarran-Ferguson Act three-prong test.27 
Currently there is a dispute over whether the New York Convention is an “act of 
Congress.”28  In Medellin v. Texas,29 the Supreme Court cited the New York 
Convention as an example of a non-self-executing treaty that required implementing 
legislation for its domestic effect.  This Note proceeds under an assumption that the 
New York Convention, which allows enforcement of arbitration clauses contained 
within contracts, is a non-self-executing treaty whose implementing legislation30 is 
an “act of Congress” within the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.  
Consequently, it is subject to reverse preemption by state anti-arbitration clauses if 
the three-prong test is satisfied.  Thus, assuming the New York Convention can 
serve as the federal law in the McCarran-Ferguson Act analysis, this Note discusses 
whether foreign insurers and foreign commerce are subject to state insurance laws.  
                                                          
 
22
 15 U.S.C. § 1012. 
 
23
 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Sept. 30, 
1970, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention]. 
 
24
 9 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. 
 
25
 See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 313-14 (1829). 
 
26
 Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 
27
 See infra Part III.B.  
 
28
 Compare Stephens, 66 F.3d at 45, with Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters 
at Lloyd’s, London, 587 F.3d 714 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 
29
 Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 526 (2008). 
 
30
 The argument that the New York Convention is an “act of Congress” rests upon a 
finding that it is non-self-executing because it depends entirely on its implementing legislation 
for its domestic effect.  See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).  Additionally, 
the treaty’s signatories did not unanimously intend for it to be self-executing.  See United 
States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 195 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting “international agreements 
should be consistently interpreted among the signatories”). 
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B.  The History and Enactment of the McCarran-Ferguson Act 
Under the United States Constitution, Congress has the power to regulate 
commerce.31  In Paul v. Virginia,32 the Supreme Court upheld a state statute that 
required the licensing of foreign insurance companies.  The Court held that the 
issuance of an insurance policy was not a transaction that Congress could regulate 
under the Commerce Clause.33  The Supreme Court adhered to this holding for more 
than seventy years, during which it upheld various state statutes regulating 
insurance.34  But everything changed in 194435 when the Supreme Court was faced 
with the question of whether, consistent with the Commerce Clause, Congress had 
the power to regulate interstate insurance transactions.  The Court’s holding in 
South-Eastern was twofold: it held that the business of insurance (1) was not beyond 
the regulatory power of Congress; and (2) was not exempt from antitrust regulation36 
under the Sherman Act.37   
This result—that the business of insurance was within the regulatory power of 
Congress—was widely criticized and perceived as a threat to state power to tax and 
regulate the insurance industry.38  Immediately after the South-Eastern decision, 
there was a call for change, and Senators McCarran and Ferguson proposed 
legislation39 to reaffirm the states’ right40 to regulate the business of insurance.  One 
year later, in 1945, Congress enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act.41  
The legislative history, floor debates, and senate reports evidence the McCarran-
Ferguson Act’s purpose.  Congress noted, “enactment of this bill will (1) remove 
existing doubts as to the right of the States to regulate and tax the business of 
insurance, and (2) secure more adequate regulation of such business.”42  During the 
congressional hearings preceding the enactment of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 
                                                          
 
31
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 [hereinafter Commerce Clause] (“The Congress shall have 
Power . . . to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with 
the Indian tribes.”).  Congress has options with regard to this power; it can choose to act or 
refrain from acting. 
 
32
 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1868). 
 
33
 Id. (emphasis added). 
 
34
 125 L. Ed. 2d 879, at *2a (2008) (“The invalidation of such statutes—in the absence of 
any federal regulation—would have meant that insurance companies could have engaged in 
interstate commerce without any legal restraint.”).  
 
35
 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533. 
 
36
 Id. at 560-61. 
 
37
 15 U.S.C. § 1013 (2006). 
 
38
 U.S. Dep’t of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1993). 
 
39
 59 Stat. 33 (1945). 
 
40
 Fabe, 508 U.S. at 500; Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Bannon, No. 1994 Conn. 
Super. LEXIS 3399, at *9 (“In 1945, . . . Congress removed all Commerce Clause limitations 
on the authority of the states to regulate and tax the business of insurance by passing the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act.).” 
 
41
 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (2006). 
 
42
 See S. REP. NO. 79-20, at 3 (1945). 
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President Franklin D. Roosevelt sent a letter to Maryland Senator Radcliffe that 
stated, “the responsibility for the regulation of the business of insurance has been left 
with the States; and I can assure you that this administration is not sponsoring 
Federal legislation to regulate insurance or to interfere with the continued regulation 
and taxation by the States of the business of insurance.”43  The importance of 
enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act was made clear in the senate reports, wherein 
Congress noted, “from its beginning the business of insurance has been regarded as a 
local matter, to be subject to and regulated by the laws of the several states.”44   
Thus, in 1945, Congress enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which provides in 
its preamble: 
The Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation 
by the several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, 
and that silence on the part of Congress shall not be construed to impose 
any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the several 
states.45 
After stating its purpose in this section, the Act further provides: 
(a) State regulation.  The business of insurance, and every person engaged 
therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to 
the regulation or taxation of such business.  
 
(b) Federal regulation.  No Act of Congress shall be construed to 
invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the 
purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or 
tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the 
business of insurance . . . .46 
The McCarran-Ferguson Act was introduced by Senators McCarran and 
Ferguson on January 18, 1945.47  It passed the House on February 23, 1945,48 the 
Senate on February 27, 1945,49 and was signed into law on March 9, 1945.  Shortly 
after the Act was signed, the Supreme Court examined Congress’ intention.  
“Obviously Congress’ purpose was broadly to give support to the existing and future 
state systems for regulating and taxing the business of insurance.”50  Congress 
achieved its purpose in two ways.  The first was by “removing obstructions which 
might . . . flow from its own power . . . .”51  The second was by “declaring expressly 
                                                          
 
43
 91 CONG. REC. 1479 (1945). 
 
44
 S. REP. NO. 79-20, at 1 (1945). 
 
45
 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2006). 
 
46
 Id. § 1012. 
 
47
 See 91 CONG. REC. 330 (1945). 
 
48
 See id. at 1396. 
 
49
 See id. at 1488-89. 
 
50
 Prudential v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 429 (1946).  See also 125 L. Ed. 2d 879, at *4 
(2008). 
 
51
 Id.  
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and affirmatively that continued state regulation and taxation of this business is in 
the public interest and that the business and all who engage in it shall be subject to 
the laws of the several states.”52  Congress was aware of the widely-varied state 
systems of regulation, yet intended to entrust its powers to the states.53  The 
enactment of the McCarran-Ferguson Act in response to South-Eastern, coupled 
with the Act’s stated purpose,54 the legislative history, and case law,55 establish that 
Congress intended for the states to regulate the industry of insurance.   
Two important Supreme Court cases followed the enactment of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act: Prudential v. Benjamin,56 and Robertson v. California.57  These two 
cases confirmed the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act—Congress intended to 
relinquish its regulatory power under the Interstate Commerce Clause in the narrow 
context of insurance.58   
In Prudential, the Supreme Court upheld, under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, a 
state law which imposed a tax on foreign insurers who wished to do business within 
the state, while not imposing the tax on local, domestic insurers.59 In reaching this 
decision, the Supreme Court reinforced the constitutionality of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, along with declaring the extent of its reach within the insurance 
industry.  The Supreme Court recognized that “Congress must have had full 
knowledge of the nation-wide existence of state systems of regulation and taxation; 
. . . that they differ greatly in scope and character; . . . [and] that many, if not all, 
include features which, to some extent, have not been applied generally to other 
interstate business.”60  Further, the Court noted that Congress’ “purpose was 
evidently to throw the whole weight of its power behind the state systems, 
notwithstanding these variations.”61   
Similarly, the Supreme Court upheld a state statute which imposed licensing 
requirements on foreign insurers, stating that it did not unduly burden commerce.62  
This case differed from Prudential because it was a criminal case wherein the state 
                                                          
 
52
 Id. at 430. 
 
53
 Id. 
 
54
 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2006). 
 
55
 Prudential, 328 U.S. 408; Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Nat’l Sec. Inc., 393 U.S. 453 
(1969); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531 (1978). 
 
56
 Prudential, 328 U.S. 408. 
 
57
 Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440 (1946). 
 
58
 Id. at 462; Prudential, 328 U.S. 408. 
 
59
 Prudential, 328 U.S. 408.  In this case, the Court used the word “foreign insurance 
company” to describe an out-of-state insurer rather than an insurer from another country.  See 
id. at 410 (referring to South Carolina and New Jersey). 
 
60
 Id. at 430. 
 
61
 Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 79-143, at 3 (1945) (“It clearly put the full weight of its 
power behind existing and future state legislation to sustain it from any attack under the 
commerce clause to whatever extent this may be done with the force of that power behind it, 
subject only to the exceptions expressly provided for.”). 
 
62
 Prudential, 328 U.S. 440. 
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statute purported to regulate, rather than tax.  However, the Court applied the logic 
of Prudential and held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not preclude a state’s 
regulation of interstate commerce.63  Notably, the Court stated “until Congress 
speaks otherwise, the Commerce Clause does not preclude a state’s exclusion of 
foreign insurers from carrying on business in the state.”64  
The Commerce Clause makes transactions across state lines subject to federal 
laws.  The purpose of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, however, is to ensure that 
activities of insurance remain subject to state regulation.65  The Supreme Court, in 
Western & Southern Life Insurance Co. v. State Board of Equalization of 
California,66 stated, “the McCarran-Ferguson Act removes entirely any commerce 
clause restriction” on a state’s power to tax the insurance industry.67  Therefore, 
“Congress removed all Commerce Clause limitations on the authority of the States to 
regulate and tax the business of insurance when it passed the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act.”68  
III.  THE CURRENT STATE OF THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT 
A.  Preemption 
Traditional preemption mandates that federal law reigns supreme over any 
conflicting state law.69  “It has been settled that state law that conflicts with federal 
law is without effect.”70  Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States 
Constitution, laws of the United States “shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”71  
When considering issues of preemption, courts “start with the assumption that the 
historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by . . . Federal Act 
unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”72  “Congress’ intent 
may be explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its 
structure and purpose.”73   
                                                          
 
63
 Id. at 449. 
 
64
 Id. at 459. 
 
65
 See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Nat’l Sec. Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969). 
 
66
 W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 451 U.S. 648 (1981). 
 
67
 Id. at 655. 
 
68
 Id. at 653. 
 
69
 See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992). 
 
70
 Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
 
71
 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 
72
 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 (citation omitted).   
 
73
 Id. (internal quotation omitted).  State law is preempted in three circumstances.  English 
v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78 (1990).  “First, Congress can define explicitly the extent to 
which its enactments pre-empt state law.”  Id. (citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 
85, 95-98 (1983)).  “Second, in the absence of explicit statutory language, . . . where [state 
law] regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended the Federal Government to occupy 
exclusively.”  Id. at 79.  This intent can be inferred from “a scheme of federal regulation . . . 
so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to 
supplement it.”  Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).  “Finally, state 
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Reverse preemption on the other hand, is an instance in which Congress declares 
that in a certain area, state law reigns supreme rather than federal law.  Reverse 
preemption establishes that only express preemption will be permitted and this 
occurs only if the applicable test demands that the federal law remains supreme.  
Thus, although ordinarily a federal law supersedes any inconsistent state law,74 the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act creates an exception to this general rule, wherein state laws 
enacted to regulate the business of insurance reverse preempt federal laws that do not 
govern this business.  This is made clear from the legislation itself.75 
B.  McCarran-Ferguson Act’s Three-Prong Test 
The McCarran-Ferguson Act reverse-preempts a federal statute if: (1) it does not 
“specifically relate to the business of insurance”; (2) the state statute was enacted 
“for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance”; and (3) the federal statute 
would “invalidate, impair, or supersede” the state statute.76  Case law has developed 
substantially in an effort to explain these prongs.  The phrase “business of insurance” 
appears in two prongs of the analysis and has caused quite a bit of litigation over the 
years.  This phrase has been explained by the Supreme Court, which identified three 
characteristics relevant to determining whether particular activities fall within the 
category: “first, whether the practice has the effect of transferring or spreading a 
policyholder’s risk; second, whether the practice is an integral part of the policy 
relationship between the insurer and the insured; and third, whether the practice is 
limited to entities within the insurance industry.”77  As a guideline, courts have also 
endeavored to define the term “insurance.”78  
The Court recognized in Fabe79 that “laws enacted for the purpose of regulating 
the business of insurance”—pursuant to the second prong of the McCarran-Ferguson 
test—consisted of “laws that possessed the end, intention, or aim of adjusting, 
managing, or controlling the business of insurance.”80  Although the Supreme Court 
                                                          
law is preempted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law.”  English, 496 U.S. at 
79.  Courts have found preemption in this circumstance when state law “stands as an obstacle 
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”  Hines 
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
 
74
 Fabe, 508 U.S. at 507. 
 
75
 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-12 (2006). 
 
76
 Fabe, 508 U.S. at 501. 
 
77
 Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982) (summarizing the criteria 
set forth by the Court in Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 
(1979), and noting “none of these criteria is necessarily determinative in itself”).   
 
78
 See Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 211 (citing WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 
1289 (unabr. 2d ed. 1958)) (defining insurance as: “[a]ct of insuring, or assuring, against loss 
or damage by a contingent event; a contract whereby, for a stipulated consideration, called a 
premium, one party undertakes to indemnify or guarantee another against loss by a certain 
specified contingency or peril, called a risk, the contract being set forth in a document called 
the policy . . . .”).   
 
79
 Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 505 (1993). 
 
80
 Id. (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1236, 1286 (6th ed. 1990)). 
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wrestled with this term,81 it settled upon the following broad definition: “statutes 
aimed at protecting or regulating [the relationship between the insurance company 
and the policyholder], directly or indirectly are laws regulating the ‘business of 
insurance.’”82  
Furthermore, the case law has helped clarify the third prong in the test for the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act’s application.  It is not enough for a state to enact a statute 
that regulates the business of insurance.  The state law and the federal law must be in 
conflict with one another, so much so that the state statutes “would be invalidated, 
impaired or superseded [by application of the federal law].”83  Thus, the McCarran-
Ferguson Act allows state law to reverse preempt federal law unless the federal law 
“contain[s] an express and unambiguous declaration that state law regarding the 
regulation of the business of insurance is preempted.”84  The key terms in the third 
prong have also been defined by the Supreme Court.85  “The term ‘invalidate’ 
ordinarily means ‘to render ineffective, generally without providing a replacement 
rule or law.  And the term ‘supersede’ ordinarily means ‘to displace’ (and thus 
render ineffective) without providing a substitute rule.”86  With respect to the 
“impair” prong, the Court has noted, “when federal law does not directly conflict 
with state regulation, and when application of the federal law would not frustrate any 
declared state policy or interfere with a State’s administrative regime, the McCarran-
Ferguson Act does not preclude its application.”87  
C.  No Limit on Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses  
Although the McCarran-Ferguson Act exempts the insurance industry from 
Commerce Clause restrictions,88 it does not limit in any way the applicability of the 
Equal Protection Clause.89  State regulations also must be kept within the limits set 
                                                          
 
81
 Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Nat’l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 460 (1969) (“[W]hatever the 
exact scope of the statutory term, it is clear where the focus was—it was on the relationship 
between the insurance company and the policyholder.”). 
 
82
 Id. at 569. 
 
83
 Miller v. Nat’l Fid. Life Ins. Co., 588 F.2d 185, 187 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 
84
 John Alden Life Ins. Co. v. Woods, 1981 WL 1403, at *4 (D. Idaho 1981); see 
generally Nat’l Sec. Inc., 393 U.S. 453. 
 
85
 Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299, 307-10 (1999). 
 
86
 Id. at 307 (citation omitted). 
 
87
 Id. at 310. 
 
88
 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 412 (1946). 
 
89
 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 880 (1985) (referring to U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV, § 1).  The distinction between the Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection 
Clause diffuses many doubts about policy implications of the McCarran-Ferguson Act 
reaching foreign insurers.  “Under Commerce Clause analysis, the State’s interest, if 
legitimate, is weighed against the burden the state law would impose on interstate commerce.”  
Id. at 881.  “In the equal protection context, however, if the State’s purpose is found to be 
legitimate, the state law stands as long as the burden it imposes is found to be rationally 
related to that purpose, a relationship that is not difficult to establish.”  Id.; see also W. & S. 
Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 657 (1981).  The Commerce Clause’s 
function is to protect interstate commerce, whereas the Equal Protection Clause’s function is 
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by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.90  The Supreme Court 
noted that within the legislative history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, there was an 
“explicit unequivocal statement that the Act was so designed as not to displace”91 the 
validity under the due process clause of particular instances of state taxation or 
regulation of insurance. 
Typically, the analysis hinges on a rational basis test.92  The Court noted:  
regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to 
be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made 
known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the 
assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge 
and experience of the legislators.93   
The rational basis test is one that the Supreme Court has applied for many years94 to 
“distinguish between domestic and out-of-state corporations.”95  The Supreme Court 
in Ward pointed out that it “has always recognized that there are certain legitimate 
restrictions or policies in which, ‘by definition, discrimination against nonresidents 
would inhere.’”96   
The Supreme Court in Kelo v. City of New London further explained the rational 
basis test,97 when it stated, “our review is limited to determining that the purpose is 
legitimate and that Congress rationally could have believed that the provisions 
would promote that objective.”98  In other words, the Court will look at whether the 
means are rationally related to a legitimate governmental end.  “By their very nature 
such inquiries, where the legislative judgment is drawn in question, must be 
restricted to the issue whether any state of facts either known or which could 
reasonably be assumed affords support for it.”99  
                                                          
to protect persons from unconstitutional discrimination by the states.  See Bethlehem Motors 
Corp. v. Flynt, 256 U.S. 421, 423-24 (1921).  The Equal Protection Clause is a large part of 
the McCarran-Ferguson analysis because, although Congress has given up its power to 
regulate interstate insurance commerce, the states are still regulated.   
 
90
 125 L. Ed. 2d 879, at *5 (2008). 
 
91
 See State Bd. of Ins. v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 370 U.S. 451 (1962) (referring to H.R. 
REP. NO. 79-143, at 3 (1945)). 
 
92
 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (calling for a rational 
relationship). 
 
93
 Id. at 152. 
 
94
 See Ward, 470 U.S. at 869. 
 
95
 Id. at 894. 
 
96
 Id. (citing Arlington Cnty. Bd. v. Richards, 434 U.S. 5, 7 (1977) (per curiam)). 
 
97
 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 
98
 Id. at 488 n.20. 
 
99
 Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 154. 
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D.  Current Split Among the Circuits 
State anti-arbitration provisions have raised a number of issues in the realm of 
the McCarran-Ferguson Act.  The United States courts of appeals have recently 
become split on the application of state insurance anti-arbitration laws to disputes 
between American insureds and foreign insurers.  While the courts are uniform in 
the view that the FAA is reverse preempted when a state law prohibits arbitration 
between an insurer and its insured,100 there is a split in authority as to whether the 
New York Convention and its implementing legislation should be treated differently.  
A panel of the Second Circuit concluded unanimously in Stephens v. American 
International Insurance Co.101 that neither the New York Convention nor its 
implementing legislation prevents state law from regulating the business of 
insurance under normal McCarran-Ferguson Act principles.102  But a majority of the 
Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, disagreed, believing that the New York Convention, 
being something other than an “act of Congress,” fell outside the McCarran-
Ferguson Act’s purview.103  The three dissenting judges, believing that the case 
presented “an exercise in garden-variety statutory interpretation,” would have found 
that the New York Convention only had force because of its implementing 
legislation that was, by its own label, an “act of Congress.”104  
E.  The Second Circuit Extends the McCarran-Ferguson Act to Foreign Insurers 
In Stephens,105 the court rejected an argument that arbitration provisions within a 
contract between a British insurer and a domestic insured should be enforced.  The 
state insurance law invalidated an arbitration clause invoked by the British insurer 
under both the FAA and the Convention Act.106  The court found that because the 
New York Convention is not self-executing, its implementing legislation was a 
federal statute that did not specifically relate to the business of insurance.107  Further, 
because the state law was enacted to regulate the business of insurance and the two 
laws were in direct conflict, the state law was preserved under the McCarran-
Ferguson Act.108  Thus, the foreign insurance companies were subject to the state 
                                                          
 
100
 See Standard Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. West, 267 F.3d 821, 823-24 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding 
that the Federal Arbitration Act was reverse preempted under the McCarran-Ferguson Act). 
 
101
 Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 
102
 Id. at 45.   
 
103
 Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 587 F.3d 714, 717 
(5th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
 
104
 Id. at 737 (Elrod, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 
105
 Stephens, 66 F.3d 41. 
 
106
 Id. 
 
107
 Id. at 45. 
 
108
 Stephens, 66 F.3d 41.  For the purposes of this Note, one should proceed under an 
assumption that the three prong test of the McCarran-Ferguson Act is satisfied.  This Note 
focuses on the narrower question of whether state laws can bind foreign insurers. 
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law that invalidated the arbitration clause in the contract.109  There are a number of 
cases that support the Second Circuit’s decision.   
Taking the Stephens holding further, in Sun Life v. Manna,110 the Supreme Court 
of Illinois expressly stated that alien insurers were within the ambit of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act.111  Sun Life involved a retaliatory tax imposed upon foreign and alien 
insurers who conducted the business of insurance within the state of Illinois.  The 
court held that the plain language of the McCarran-Ferguson Act imposed no 
limitations on the imposition of the tax on an alien insurer.112  Further, Congress has 
never subsequently enacted legislation prohibiting the imposition of any retaliatory 
taxes on alien insurers.113   
The regulation of foreign and alien insurers by a state should be appropriate 
because the courts have already recognized that a state may discriminate on other 
companies within its own borders.114  It has also been recognized that “for a foreign 
company to do business in a state is a privilege, not a right.”115  Additionally, “an 
insurer who elects to do business in the state also impliedly consents to be bound by 
the state’s statutes regulating the insurance industry.”116  Thus, as long as a state 
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause,117 there should be no reason to hold 
that a state cannot impose reasonable regulations upon a foreign or alien insurer 
doing business within the state under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.118   
F.  The Fifth Circuit Limits the McCarran-Ferguson Act to Domestic Insurers 
In Safety National,119 an en banc panel of the Fifth Circuit held that a state anti-
arbitration statute did not reverse preempt the New York Convention under the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act.120  In so holding, the court focused on the New York 
                                                          
 
109
 Id. at 45.  Thus, the court held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act could reach foreign 
commerce. 
 
110
 Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Manna, 879 N.E.2d 320 (Ill. 2007). 
 
111
 Id. at 331.   
 
112
 Id. 
 
113
 Id. See also McKnight v. Chicago Title Insurance Co., 358 F.3d 854, 855 (11th Cir. 
2004), where the court held that a state law excluding arbitration provisions was not 
preempted by federal law that permitted them.  Although McKnight involved an interstate, 
domestic dispute, Sun Life expressly held, two years later, that alien insurers were not exempt 
from provisions of the McCarran-Ferguson Act that reverse preempt federal laws.  Sun Life, 
879 N.E.2d at 331. 
 
114
 See, e.g., Int’l Ins. Co. v. Caja Nacional de Ahorro y Seguro, No. 00 C 6703, 2001 WL 
322005 (N.D. Ill. 2001). 
 
115
 43 AM. JUR. 2d Insurance § 49 (2010) (citing State ex rel. Life of Maryland, Inc. v. 
Katz, 447 N.E.2d 116 (Ohio 1983)).   
 
116
 Id. (citing Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Bennett, 635 S.W.2d 482 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981)). 
 
117
 See supra Part III.C. 
 
118
 See supra note 115. 
 
119
 Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 587 F.3d 714 (5th 
Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
 
120
 Id. 
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Convention and determined that the treaty did not fall under the term “act of 
Congress” as used in the McCarran-Ferguson Act.  Thus, the court held the state law 
subordinate to the New York Convention which permitted arbitration.121  The court, 
however, never expressly stated that the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not, under any 
circumstances, reach foreign insurers.  
Proponents, in favor of the en banc Fifth Circuit decision in Safety National and 
the broader concept that the McCarran-Ferguson Act should not apply to foreign 
insurance companies,122 support their position through the text of the statute and its 
legislative history.  This argument begins with the textual language of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act.  A basic rule of statutory construction is that courts need not look 
beyond the plain language unless that language is unclear or ambiguous.123   
The plain language argument is comprised of two key distinctions.  First, it is 
important to distinguish between foreign commerce and interstate commerce.  
Foreign commerce is the exchange of goods or services “between nations.”124  
Interstate commerce deals only with the exchange of goods or services “between 
those located in different states.”125  Second, there is a distinction between the power 
of commerce that is granted.  The Constitution grants Congress distinct powers 
regarding commerce: to regulate “Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the 
several States, and with the Indian tribes.”126  The McCarran-Ferguson Act, on the 
other hand, applies only to commerce among “the several States.”127  Because the 
language of the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not give a clear statement indicating 
the areas of commerce to which it applies, the proponents of this view conclude that 
it should not apply to foreign insurers.  However, the McCarran-Ferguson Act does 
not limit its application to interstate commerce;128 thus, one may reasonably presume 
that the Act governs both foreign and interstate commerce. 
Proponents suggest that courts should look beyond the plain language and 
consider the Senate and House Reports as well as the Congressional Record to show 
that the Act was intended to apply only to interstate commerce.  There is no express 
mention in the Congressional Reports of any effect on foreign commerce or foreign 
affairs, and congressional intent can be expressed by omission as well as inclusion of 
language in the statute and discussion in the legislative history.129  Proponents of the 
                                                          
 
121
 Id.  The court also conceded that the New York Convention does not specifically relate 
to the business of insurance.  Id. at 720. 
 
122
 See generally Raymond A. Guenter, Rediscovering the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s 
Commerce Clause Limitation, 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 253 (2000). 
 
123
 Passa v. Derderian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.R.I. 2004). 
 
124
 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 285 (8th ed. 2004). 
 
125
 Id. 
 
126
 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 
127
 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (“[S]ubject to the laws of the several states . . . .”). 
 
128
 See infra Part IV.A. 
 
129
 See Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971).  In Rewis, the Court declined to 
accept an expansive interpretation of the Travel Act.  Id.  Because the factors that would give 
the Act such a broad interpretation were “not even discussed in the legislative history,” the 
Court held that it showed Congress did not intend the statute to have broader reach.  Id. 
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Fifth Circuit’s view also point out that the Senators who proposed the McCarran-
Ferguson Act mentioned only “interstate” commerce.  Senator Ferguson emphasized 
that “what we have in mind is that the insurance business, being interstate 
commerce, if we merely enact a law relating to interstate commerce, or if there is a 
law now on the statute books relating in some way to interstate commerce, it would 
not apply to insurance.”130  Further, Senator O’Mahoney stated that “there is not a 
line or sentence in the proposed act . . . which would delegate to any State the power 
to legislate in the field of . . . foreign commerce.”131   
The proponents fail to recognize that the comments of the Senators and much of 
the floor debates were discussions in response to South-Eastern.  One could argue 
that because South-Eastern dealt only with interstate commerce132 and because the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act was in direct response to South-Eastern, the Act only 
reaches interstate commerce.  This argument, however, ignores the crucial point that 
Congress was aware of the many international insurance contracts that were being 
entered into at the time.133  Congress could have limited the McCarran-Ferguson Act 
to interstate commerce if it so desired, but it chose not to place any limit on the type 
of commerce states can govern, so long as the state laws serve the purpose of 
regulating the business of insurance. 
Lastly, proponents of the Fifth Circuit’s view claim that allowing states to 
regulate foreign insurers impairs uniformity.  In Japan Line,134 the Supreme Court 
struck down a state tax affecting foreign commerce because it impaired uniformity in 
foreign relations.  The Court focused on the fact that there was a need for the federal 
government to “speak with one voice” in issues affecting foreign commerce and 
foreign affairs.135  Similarly, in Garamendi,136 the Supreme Court held that a 
California law directly conflicting with executive conduct in foreign affairs was 
preempted, despite the McCarran-Ferguson Act.137  The Court stated that the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act did not give a state the power to regulate the business of 
insurance carried out beyond its own borders.138  This argument relies upon 
distinguishable case law and fails to address foreign insurance companies that enter 
the United States and conduct business within state borders.  
                                                          
 
130
 91 CONG. REC. 1487 (1945) (emphasis added). 
 
131
 Id. at 1483. 
 
132
 See generally United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). 
 
133
 The mid-1940s was the height of the insurance industry and foreign companies like 
Lloyds of London were conducting much business internationally.  For purposes of statutory 
interpretation, courts must presume Congress was aware of such worldly factors when it 
drafted the statute. 
 
134
 Japan Line, Ltd. v. Los Angeles Cnty., 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979). 
 
135
 Id. 
 
136
 See generally Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003). 
 
137
 See id. at 428. 
 
138
 See id. (citing FTC v. Travelers Health Ass’n, 362 U.S. 293, 300-01 (1960)). 
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G.  Arguments Restricting Application Are Misguided 
The case law is misleading when shaped to support the Fifth Circuit’s view.  
Cases that purport to limit the McCarran-Ferguson Act to domestic insurers alone 
are easily distinguishable and devoid of reasoning.  For example, when the Supreme 
Court held that a state statute should be preempted by a federal law for interfering 
with foreign policy,139 its decision was largely based upon executive agreements of 
the President, made without congressional authority.  The executive agreements in 
Garamendi were not considered an “act of Congress” and therefore did not warrant 
application of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.140  However, under an assumption that 
the New York Convention’s implementing legislation is an “act of Congress,” the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act is implicated.   
Moreover, when a court held that the New York Convention superseded the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act,141 the holding was not based upon a construction of the 
scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act as applying only to domestic contracts.  In fact, 
the court expressly declined to reach the broader question in the case of whether the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act applies to international contracts.142  Two unpublished 
decisions from the district courts of Florida and Louisiana also seem to reject claims 
that McCarran-Ferguson can apply to foreign insurers.143  However, these cases are 
devoid of reasoning and involved extraterritorial disputes.  In Antillean, the district 
court reached the decision that the McCarran-Ferguson Act could not apply to the 
dispute at issue because it “was intended to apply only to interstate commerce, and 
not foreign commerce.”144  There was no reasoning offered by the court and there is 
no basis for its conclusory statement.  That is precisely the issue the court in 
Goshawk declined to answer.145   
Furthermore, the policy concerns the Court addressed in Japan Line146 do not 
preclude the Court from including foreign insurers within the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act’s reach.  The Court expressed the importance in respecting international 
arbitration agreements and creating and maintaining uniformity with regard to 
foreign affairs.147  While those concerns are necessary for the United States Supreme 
Court to consider, they are not outweighed or trumped by including foreign insurers 
within the McCarran-Ferguson Act.  In fact, the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s purpose 
                                                          
 
139
 Id. at 396. 
 
140
 Id.  It should be noted that the Court in Garamendi did not expressly hold the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act inapplicable to foreign insurers. 
 
141
 Goshawk Dedicated Ltd. v. Portsmouth Settlement Co., 466 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1303 
(N.D. Ga. 2006). 
 
142
 Id. at 1308. 
 
143
 See Antillean Marine Shipping Corp. v. Through Transp. Mut. Ins., No. 02-22196-Civ., 
2002 WL 32075793, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2002); McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Underwriters at 
Lloyd’s, London, No. 91-841, 1992 WL 37695, at *4 (E.D. La. Feb. 14, 1992). 
 
144
 Antillean Marine Shipping Corp., 2002 WL 32075793, at *3. 
 
145
 Goshawk Dedicated Ltd., 466 F. Supp. 2d at 1308. 
 
146
 Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448-49. 
 
147
 Id. 
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is to carve out a narrow category, wherein states may regulate the insurance 
industry.  Congress has expressly given its power to speak with one voice to the 
states whenever the business of insurance is at issue.  It is only in this area that the 
states regulate those who enter into their province, assume contracts therein, and 
affect their residents.  State regulation of a foreign entity’s conduct within its own 
borders is not an attempt to regulate foreign commerce.  The Supreme Court has 
never delineated between foreign and domestic insurers when determining whether a 
particular law applies to the business of insurance—there is no reason why it should 
now find such a distinction.  
IV.  WHY THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD FOLLOW THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S LINE OF 
AUTHORITY AND APPLY THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT TO FOREIGN INSURERS 
The Supreme Court should apply the McCarran-Ferguson Act to international 
insurance contracts and domestic contracts alike because the Act contains no 
language limiting its application to interstate disputes and any such interpretation 
would be inconsistent with the statute’s purpose, history, and public policy.  The 
McCarran-Ferguson Act’s language does not limit the scope of laws affecting 
interstate or foreign commerce.  Further, the purpose of the Act is to allow the states 
to regulate the insurance business.  Finally, the McCarran-Ferguson Act should not 
be construed to allow foreign insurers the right to compel arbitration when domestic 
insurers are denied these same rights.  
A.  Plain Language  
Rules of statutory construction provide guidance for the courts in determining 
that the McCarran-Ferguson Act should apply to foreign and domestic insurers alike.  
“[T]he starting point in a case involving construction of the McCarran-Ferguson Act 
. . . is the language of the statute itself.”148  A corollary rule of statutory construction 
mandates that the Supreme Court look no further than the Act’s plain language.  
“When the statutory language is clear on its face, and its words ‘neither create 
ambiguity nor lead to an entirely unreasonable interpretation,’ an inquiring court 
must apply the statute as written, and ‘need not consult other aids to statutory 
construction.’”149  The McCarran-Ferguson Act is interpreted based on its plain 
language, which does not exclude foreign insurers or foreign commerce from its 
reach.150   
                                                          
 
148
 Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 210 (1979) (citing St. 
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 541 (1978)).   
 
149
 Passa v. Derderian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 43, 51 (D.R.I. 2004) (quoting Atlantic Fish Spotters 
Ass’n v. Evans, 321 F.3d 220, 224 (1st Cir. 2003)).  This is different from treaty 
interpretation.  When interpreting treaties, courts often look beyond the plain language 
because “[t]reaties are contracts between or among independent nations.”  United States v. 
Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249, 1261 (5th Cir. 1988).  Because treaties are contracts, they do not 
create rights that are enforceable in courts.  See United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 
195 (5th Cir. 2001).  It is important to distinguish between treaties and statutes because the 
New York Convention is a treaty, and its implementing legislation takes domestic effect.  In 
order to determine that it is a non-self-executing treaty and thus, an “act of Congress” within 
the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, outside aids must be consulted. 
 
150
 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-12.  The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides, in relevant part, 
“[t]he business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of 
the Several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business.”  Id. § 1012(a) 
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To provide clarity in statutory construction, “the plain meaning of legislation 
should be conclusive, except in the ‘rare cases [in which] the literal application of a 
statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intention of its 
drafters.’”151  A complementary rule of statutory construction mandates that courts 
must give effect to every clause and word of a statute.152  As previously stated, the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act provides there will not be “any barrier” to prevent 
regulation of “every person” involved in the business of insurance.153  The plain 
meaning of the words of the McCarran-Ferguson Act should be regarded as 
conclusive to show that Congress, by including the words “any” and “every,” must 
have intended not to limit its application to domestic insurers.   
 “Where the legislature has not defined words used in the act, a court must then 
determine the meaning of the language in accordance with the legislative intent and 
common understanding to prevent absurdities and to advance justice.”154  Further, 
“[courts] may ‘assume that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary 
meaning of the words used.’”155  Because the common understanding of the term 
“every” includes “all possible” and “constitut[es] each and all members of a group 
without exception,”156 this necessarily implies that Congress intended to include 
foreign insurers within the purview of the Act.  Additionally, the term “person” 
includes corporations and companies.157  The use of these words illustrates 
Congress’ intent to use unrestrictive language.  The Fifth Circuit’s untenable attempt 
to engraft restrictive terms such as “interstate” or “domestic” is illogical and 
inconsistent with the purpose of the Act.  The language of the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act, on its face, is clear and unambiguous.  Therefore, one need not look to outside 
sources when interpreting the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.  The 
Supreme Court should not ignore the plain language and create a limit where none 
was intended.158   
                                                          
(emphasis added).  The Act further states, “[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to 
invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the 
business of insurance . . . unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance.”  Id. 
§ 1012(b) (emphasis added).  
 
151
 United States v. Ron Pair, 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic 
Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)) (emphasis added). 
 
152
 U.S. Dep’t of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 504 (1993). 
 
153
 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-12 (emphasis added). 
 
154
 1A NORMAN SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 20.08 (7th ed. 2007). 
 
155
 Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982) (quoting Richards v. United 
States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962)). 
 
156
 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 617 (4th ed. 2000). 
 
157
 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the 
context indicates otherwise—the word[] ‘person’ . . . include[s] corporations, companies, 
associations, [and] firms, . . . as well as individuals . . . .”); accord United States v. Union 
Supply Co., 215 U.S. 50 (1909) (“A corporation is a ‘person’ within [the] meaning of [the] act 
. . . .”).   
 
158
 New York Convention, art. II, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3.  There is a textual 
interpretation argument relating to the New York Convention as well that helps explain why 
the treaty is non-self-executing and thus an “act of Congress” subject to the McCarran-
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As observed by a District of Columbia court, “absent a clearly expressed 
legislative intention to the contrary, [the plain meaning] must ordinarily be regarded 
as conclusive.”159  The effect of the language of the McCarran-Ferguson Act is to 
impose a clearly stated rule, wherein “state laws that are enacted for the purpose of 
regulating the business of insurance do not yield to conflicting federal statutes unless 
a federal statute specifically requires otherwise.”160  This clear rule makes apparent 
Congress’ intention of leaving the regulation of the insurance industry to the states.  
Because the New York Convention and its implementing legislation do not include a 
clear statement that it relates the business of insurance, the McCarran-Ferguson Act 
should apply and allow state anti-arbitration clauses to invalidate federal arbitration 
clauses.   
Even if the Court decided it needed to look beyond the plain language, the 
purpose of the McCarran-Ferguson Act is clearly stated in its preamble.161  The 
McCarran-Ferguson Act grants states the power to “regulate or tax” the insurance 
industry.162  By enacting McCarran-Ferguson, Congress expressly gave up its power 
to control the business of insurance.  “The primary concern of Congress” was to 
“ensure that the States would continue to have the ability to tax and regulate the 
business of insurance.”163  No restrictive language in the Act suggests that these 
powers apply only to domestic insurers.  The legislative history of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act warrants that the states are to be the regulators of the insurance 
industry as a whole.   
B.  State Laws Govern Foreign Insurers 
States are permitted, under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, to tax foreign 
insurers.164  In Sun Life, the Supreme Court of Illinois upheld a retaliatory tax on 
                                                          
Ferguson Act.  The New York Convention originally stated, “[t]he court of a Contracting 
Stat[e] . . . shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration . . . .”  Id. 
(emphasis added).  However, when the United States implemented legislation that adopted the 
New York Convention, the mandatory language relating to arbitration clauses was changed to 
permissive: “A court having jurisdiction . . . may direct that arbitration be held in accordance 
with the agreement . . . .”  9 U.S.C. § 206 (2006) (emphasis added).  This distinction is crucial.  
The treaty called for mandatory arbitration but by making it permissive in the Convention Act, 
Congress presumably recognized that arbitration will not be warranted in every case, and 
wanted to leave discretion in the courts.  For example, “[t]he Sherman Act’s commitment to 
free competitive markets is among our most important civil policies.  This commitment, 
shared by other nations which are signatory to the [New York] Convention, is hardly the sort 
of parochial concern that we should decline to enforce in the interest of international comity.”  
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 661 (1985) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (citations omitted).  The importance of McCarran-Ferguson and states’ regulation 
of insurance closely mirrors the Sherman Act’s recognized importance in the domestic 
context.  The McCarran-Ferguson Act, like the Sherman Act, is too important to allow 
international comity concerns to govern these narrow subject matters. 
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161
 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2006).   
 
162
 Id. § 1012(a). 
 
163
 Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 217-18 (1979). 
 
164
 Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Manna, 879 N.E.2d 320, 331 (Ill. 2007). 
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foreign and alien insurers.165  Illinois state law mandated that a tax would be placed 
on foreign and alien insurers only—no similar tax was imposed on domestic 
companies.166  The court upheld that retaliatory tax under the umbrella term 
“taxation” within the McCarran-Ferguson Act.167  Most notably, the Sun Life court 
stated, “the McCarran-Ferguson Act permits the states to regulate alien insurers.”168  
Precedent from cases like Sun Life, where a retaliatory tax fell under the umbrella 
term “taxation,” provide a foundation for a court to reasonably find that a state’s 
anti-arbitration provision falls under the umbrella term “regulation.”  As long as the 
underlying purpose of the regulation or tax is sufficiently related to the business of 
insurance, courts will uphold it under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.  Sun Life 
expressly held that “alien insurers are within the ambit of the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act.”169  
Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, states have been permitted to regulate 
foreign insurers in other contexts as well.  State law purporting to regulate the 
business of insurance by requiring companies to post bond before responding to suit 
was enforced against foreign insurers under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.170  This is 
also true, even when domestic insurers were not required to do the same.171  These 
cases suggest that so long as the state law at issue concerns the business of insurance 
and meets the three-prong test of the McCarran-Ferguson Act,172 it will reach any 
insurer. 
In Republic Insurance Co.,173 a district court rejected the claim that the Swedish 
reinsurance company did not have to pay bond before responding to suit.  The court 
focused on the fact that the requirement was placed on all insurers across the 
board.174  However, in a another case,175 a different court was faced with a similar 
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 Id.  Illinois classified insurance companies into three categories: domestic, foreign, and 
alien.  Id. at 322.  “Domestic” insurers are Illinois insurers.  Id.  “Foreign” described those 
organized under the laws of other states.  Id.  “Alien” insurers are those organized under the 
laws of another country.  Id. 
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 Id. at 323. 
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 Id. at 331 (emphasis added).  The fact that the court used the word “regulate” is an 
important point to note.  The McCarran-Ferguson Act permits the “regulation and taxation” of 
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McCarran-Ferguson Act imposes no limitation on the imposition of the tax on an alien 
insurer.”  Id. at 331.   
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state law, yet it extended the Republic Insurance Co. holding to a situation in which 
domestic companies did not face the same requirement.176  In Caja Nacional, state 
law required a foreign or alien company to file a pre-judgment security with the 
court that was sufficient to secure the payment of any final judgment that may be 
rendered prior to filing any pleadings with the court.177  The federal law provided 
domestic states immunity from filing this pre-judgment security.178  Ultimately, the 
court applied the McCarran-Ferguson Act and held the Swedish reinsurance 
company was not immune from the state law.179 
Courts have also applied the McCarran-Ferguson Act to bankruptcy proceedings 
between a United States domestic insurance company and an Israeli reinsurance 
company.180  Although the court ultimately held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act did 
not apply to this case, this was not based upon reasoning that the Act does not 
encompass foreign insurers.  The court applied the three-prong test to the contract 
and determined that the state law and the federal law were not in conflict.181  “Rather 
than being contrary to the [federal law], the insurance laws of [the states] relating to 
the liquidation of nondomiciliary insolvent insurers are remarkably similar to federal 
law in their underlying purpose.”182  The court’s holding relied entirely on the fact 
that the federal law at issue would not “invalidate, impair, or supersede”183 the state 
law at issue; it had nothing to do with the fact that the reinsurance company’s 
contract was international.184   
If the Act did not encompass foreign companies, the bankruptcy court 
presumably would not have gone through the tedious task of applying the prongs of 
the test to the facts of the case.  Instead, it would have dismissed the case on the 
basis of the McCarran-Ferguson Act not reaching foreign companies.  Because it did 
not do so, one may reasonably infer that the McCarran-Ferguson Act applies to 
foreign and domestic insurers alike.  
Because the federal government allows states to tax and impose bonding 
mandates, it is necessary that states also have the power to demand or deny 
arbitration where insurance contracts, often contracts of adhesion, are limited in 
terms of liability.  It is apparent from the plain language185 of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act and the numerous cases validating its reach186 that states may regulate 
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the conduct of all insurers, domestic and foreign alike, operating within their borders 
to the extent their conduct falls within the business of insurance.  For example, in 
Wilburn Boat Co.,187 state law was applied to maritime disputes, despite the 
Admiralty Clause,188 which granted federal jurisdiction over the claim.  Similarly, 
the Supreme Court should find that because state anti-arbitration clauses purport 
only to regulate the business of insurance within its borders, it can reverse-preempt 
the New York Convention by way of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.   
C.  Public Policy  
To construe the McCarran-Ferguson Act in a way that restricts its application to 
domestic insurers alone would produce unjust, far-reaching results that would, in 
effect, permit foreign insurance companies to have rights over domestic individuals 
that domestic companies do not have.  Insurance contracts are classified as contracts 
of adhesion because they are drafted solely by the insurance company, while the 
policyholder has no bargaining power with regard to the formation of the policy.  
Thus, an insurance policy is and should be liberally construed in favor of the insured.  
The purpose of the McCarran-Ferguson Act is to protect policyholders, regardless of 
where the insurance company is domiciled.  
The burden placed upon a United States resident, in enforcing the New York 
Convention and sending it to another country in order to pursue arbitration, is unduly 
burdensome.189  If the company came into the state to create the policy, and the 
actions were carried out in the state, there is no basis to find it unreasonable to 
expect it to return in order to defend itself from suit.  “Consideration of a fully 
developed record by a jury, instructed in the law by a federal judge, and subject to 
appellate review, is a surer guide to the competitive character of a commercial 
practice than the practically unreviewable judgment of a private arbitrator.”190  
Although the Supreme Court has previously held valid an arbitration clause 
between a foreign and domestic company in Scherk,191 this situation is distinct.  The 
arbitration clause was upheld in that case192 because the negotiations were conducted 
in both countries, both countries had experts assisting them, and the deal was closed 
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and signed in the foreign country.193  The Court noted, “most significantly, the 
subject matter of the contract concerned the sale of business enterprises organized 
under the laws of and primarily situated in European countries, whose activities were 
largely, if not entirely, directed to European markets.”194  On the other hand, in a 
case where the contract was signed in the United States, primarily for the benefit of 
an American citizen, although the parties may be involved in an international 
contract, the McCarran-Ferguson Act should apply.  This is especially true if the 
business activities were entirely directed at the American market because the policy 
concerns of Scherk would have no bearing on the case. 
The international comity gained by enforcing arbitration agreements does not 
outweigh the importance of leaving the regulation of the insurance industry to the 
states.  “Laws [regulating the business of insurance] symbolize the public interest in 
having the States continue to serve as the preeminent regulators of insurance in our 
federal system and indicate the special status of insurance in the realm of state 
sovereignty.”195  Further, it is accepted that by enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 
“Congress intended to declare . . . that uniformity of regulation and state taxation are 
not required in reference to the business of insurance.”196   
In restricting the McCarran-Ferguson Act to domestic insurers alone, the courts 
“step out of their proper role [and] rely on no legislative or even executive text, but 
only on inference and implication, to preempt state laws on foreign affairs 
grounds.”197  Courts accept that Congress enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act to 
“immunize state insurance regulatory statutes from federal preemption.”198  Public 
policy dictates that the McCarran-Ferguson Act should not be narrowed to exclude 
foreign insurers from its application.  This result would unduly burden state residents 
and the ripple effect would undermine the congressional intent of leaving the 
insurance industry to the states.  Also, because there is no federal instrument that 
includes a clear statement by Congress that it intended for the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act to exclude foreign insurers from its application, it should not be limited to 
domestic insurers alone. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The McCarran-Ferguson Act specifies that state law relating to the business of 
insurance shall not be “invalidated, impaired, or superseded by an Act of Congress 
unless such Act relates to the business of insurance.”199  It does not say unless such 
Act relates to foreign commerce.  It does not distinguish or exempt foreign carriers 
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from the business of insurance.  To the contrary, the McCarran-Ferguson Act 
governs “every person” engaged in the business of insurance.200  Therefore, it is not 
limited to domestic insurers; it should apply to foreign insurers as well. 
Beyond the plain language, the legislative history and early cases interpreting the 
Act201 make clear Congress’ intent that the states be the sole regulators of this 
business.  Because the national government has chosen not to regulate foreign 
insurers and has allowed the states to control in this area, if the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act does not include foreign companies, those companies would be wholly 
unregulated.202  Policyholders in the United States face unfair and deceptive business 
practices from insurers both at home and abroad.  Limiting the reach of the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act to matters of domestic commerce alone leaves 
policyholders completely unprotected from these risks.   
Critics might say, when two large companies, both worth millions of dollars are 
involved, each party has its own legal team and the contracts are clearly negotiated.  
However, if the Supreme Court were to step in and create this limitation—excluding 
foreign insurance companies from the ambit of the McCarran-Ferguson Act—the 
insurance companies would be unregulated.  Implications of that ruling would reach 
far beyond the multi-million dollar companies.  Each person who contracted with a 
foreign insurance company, who lacked the sophisticated understanding of these 
complicated areas of law, who operated under the presumption that state law will 
prevail, would be forced across international waters to pursue a claim.  Additionally, 
if forced to arbitrate, these individuals may be left with the decision of an arbitration 
panel in another country and with no relief in the United States.  This was not the 
intention of Congress when it passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act.  Therefore, the 
Supreme Court should adopt the Second Circuit’s opinion that the McCarran-
Ferguson Act reaches foreign insurers.  
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